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Abstract
The Savage and the Anscombe-Aumann frameworks are the two most popular ap-
proaches used when modeling ambiguity. The former is more exible, but the latter
is often preferred for its simplicity. We conduct an experiment where subjects place
bets on the joint outcome of an ambiguous urn and a fair coin. We document that
more than a third of our subjects make choices that are incompatible with Anscombe-
Aumann for any preferences, while the Savage framework is exible enough to account
for subjectsbehaviors.
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1 Introduction
The Savage (1954) and the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) frameworks are the two most popular
approaches when it comes to modelling ambiguity. The latter is a two-stage model where
acts are maps from states to objective lotteries over consequences. It is often preferred
for its simplicity, but the Savage model provides more exibility. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) and Schmeidler (1989) used the Anscombe and Aumann approach as a basis for their
seminal contributions to ambiguity theory. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) show that, for
standard ambiguity models like Choquet expected utility (CEU) and Maxmin Expected
Utility, ambiguity aversion implies a strict preference for randomization when looked at
in the Anscombe-Aumann framework. They also show that the same need not hold in
the Savage framework. Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) argue against the plausibility of a
general preference for randomization but also admit the need for further experiments on
this question.1
We implement an experiment in which some choices are inconsistent with ambiguity
models that are based on the preference framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). We
show that these choices can be consistent within a Savage framework using e.g. a CEU
model as in Eichberger and Kelsey (1996). The experiment involves subjects choosing
from among six options that each relate to the outcomes of a coin ip and a draw from
an ambiguous, 2-color urn. Two of the six options result in a clearly ambiguous act.
Two more of the six options result in a clearly risky act. The last two options would be
considered risky acts within the Anscombe-Aumann framework, but would be treated as
ambiguous acts within the Savage framework. By manipulating the payo¤s within the
various acts, we are able to create a dominance relationship between the four risky acts
using the Anscombe-Aumann framework. We nd that dominated acts are still chosen by
subjects more than a third of the time. The same subject choices can be explained with
ambiguity models using the Savage framework, where the dominance relationship does not
necessarily hold.
The two acts that highlight the di¤erences between the two frameworks involve ambi-
guity hedging (see Oechssler and Roomets, 2014, and Oechssler et al. 2019). These acts
are akin to betting on one color when a coin ip comes up heads, and a di¤erent color
when the coin ip comes up tails. Within the Anscombe Aumann framework, subjects
1 In the meantime a number of experiments (see in particular, Dominiak and Schnedler, 2011, and
Oechssler, Rau, and Roomets, 2019) have shown that indeed few subjects have a strict preferences for
randomization.
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making such a combination exploit the complementarity of the probabilities of the two
colors of balls in the urn to arrive at a believed 50:50 chance to win the bet. Within the
Savage framework, such complementarity need not be assumed. Subjects are allowed to
believe that the probabilities of the two colors depend on the coin ip. So, when a subject
considers choosing an act that combines bets on blue (when the coins shows heads) and
yellow (when the coin shows tails), the subject could believe that blue is unlikely when the
coin shows heads and also that yellow is unlikely when the coin shows tails. Therefore,
while the hedge acts represent risk using the Anscombe-Aumann framework, the same acts
represent ambiguity using the Savage framework.
While it may seem we are pitting one framework against the other in a mano-a-mano
bout, we caution readers that the way we have been able to design choices leaves Savage
mostly out of harms way while placing Anscombe and Aumann in jeopardy. Some may
point out that the exibility of the Savage framework is what keeps it out of the fray,
and that this exibility should be considered an advantage. We can not disagree, but we
leave discussions of the relative exibility of the frameworks to more theoretical papers. As
a fundamentally experimental endeavor, this paper should be viewed primarily as a test
of the Anscombe-Aumann framework. Our results are not supportive of the Anscombe-
Aumann framework in this context. This represents our main nding and contribution.
It is, of course, interesting that the Savage framework could have explained our subjects
behavior when the Anscombe-Aumann framework could not. However, this should not be
considered direct support for the Savage framework as there was no way it could have failed
in our experimental setting.
2 Experimental design
The experiment consisted of a single incentivized task,2 followed by an unincentivized
questionnaire. Subject had to choose one of the six acts that depended on the outcome
of a fair coin and the outcome of a draw from an Ellsberg urn.3 The urn contained 24
blue and yellow balls in a composition that was unknown to subjects. Subjects were told
that any combination from 0 blue balls (and 24 yellow balls) to 24 blue balls (and 0 yellow
balls) was possible. In treatment A, subjects chose from the six acts listed in Table 1. In
2Having several tasks with some probabilistic or xed payment rule would run the risk of confounding
ambiguity with hedging motives or with attitudes towards compound lotteries (see e.g. Halevy, 2007).
3 In the actual experiment, we used a non-transparent bag and blue and yellow marbles. For expositional
reasons, we employ the more customary urns and balls in the text.
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treatment B the payo¤s of $21 and $22 were interchanged, while all other design aspects
were kept constant. The payo¤s were chosen so as to act as a tie-breaker for subjects
who thought that some or all states are equally likely and to create the aforementioned
dominance relationship within the Anscombe-Aumann framework.
Table 1: Acts and payo¤s
acts coin shows heads coin shows tails
ball blue ball yellow ball blue ball yellow
s1 s2 s3 s4
blue(bb) $21 $0 $21 $0
yellow(yy) $0 $21 $0 $21
heads(h) $20 $20 $0 $0
tails(t) $0 $0$ $20 $20
hedge by(by) $22 $0 $0 $22
hedge yb(yb) $0 $22 $22 $0
In the experiment, the acts were labeled neutrally Option Athrough Option Fand
were presented in a random order. Here we have given them names that highlight their
nature. The headsact, for example, will win if the coin shows heads, regardless of the
ball draw. The hedge ybact would win if the ball drawn is yellow and the coin shows
headsor if the ball drawn is blue and the coin shows tails.
At the end of the experiment, subject volunteers drew a ball from the urn and tossed
the fair coin. Importantly, the ball was drawn rst (and shown to subjects), then the coin
was tossed.4 This timing was explained in the instructions.
After the acts were chosen, but before the random variables were determined, subjects
lled out a questionnaire. The questionnaire included unincentivized questions about how
subjects chose their bet in the elicitation task, a hypothetical three-color Ellsberg experi-
ment, demographics, a hypothetical two-color Ellsberg urn, and beliefs about the random
variables in the elicitation task (see the appendix for the questionnaire).
Experiments were conducted using pen and paper at the Economics Science Laboratory
at the University of Arizona. Subjects were students at the university. There were 93
subjects in treatment A (57% female) and 31 subjects in treatment B (48% female). The
experiment took roughly 30 minutes, and subjects received an average of $19.91 including
4This was done so that we did not need to rely on the reversal-of-order axiom (see Anscombe and
Aumann, 1963).
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a $10 show-up fee. Decisions and payments were made privately (with respect to other
subjects).
Instructions (see Appendix) were distributed on paper and read aloud at the beginning
of the experiment. Urns were on display during the entire experiment, so that subjects
could be certain that the urnscontents could not be manipulated. Subjects were allowed
to verify the urnscontents after the experiment, and some did.
3 Hypotheses
The two standard approaches to model uncertainty, the Anscombe and Aumann (1963)
and the Savage (1954) framework, di¤er in the way they model a randomization device
like a fair coin (see e.g. Eichberger and Kelsey, 1996, or Klibano¤, 2004). In the Savage
framework, the outcomes of a randomizing device must be modelled explicitly as part of
the description of a state. The state space is the Cartesian product SS = U  R; where
U = fb; yg is the outcome of the draw from an urn (ambiguous) and R = fH;Tg is the
outcome of a fair coin ip (objective randomization device). Hence, e.g. s1 = bH denotes
the state where the drawn ball was blue and the coin ip produced heads. Thus, in our
experiment we have the state space S = fs1; :::s4g listed in Table 1 and a nite set of
consequences X = f0; 20; 21; 22g. An act is a map f : SS ! X and preferences are dened
as binary relations on F , the set of all acts.
In the experiment there were the six acts listed in Table 1. Figure 1 illustrates the
three types of acts available, the hedge acts (by; yb), the color acts (bb; yy), and the
coinacts (h; t). The tree to the left shows the hedge byact, the tree in center shows
the act blue, and the tree to the right shows the act heads.5
In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, randomization devices are incorporated into the
consequence space. The state space would consist only of SAA = fb; yg. Consequences
would be all simple lotteries (probability distributions) on X, denoted by (X). Acts in
the Anscombe-Aumann world are maps f : S ! (X) and are listed in Table 2.
The crucial thing to note is that in an Anscombe and Aumann framework, both the
hedgeacts and the coinacts yield objective 50:50 lotteries. However, the hedge acts
yield lotteries that pay out $22 ($21 in Treatment B) when successful while the coin acts
only pay out $20. Thus, any decision maker should strictly prefer either of the hedge acts
5The remaining three acts are the mirror images of these three acts.
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Table 2: Acts and payo¤s in Anscombe-Aumann
ball blue ball yellow
s1 s2
hedge acts (by; yb) 12$22 +
1
2$0
1
2$22 +
1
2$0
coin acts (h; t) 12$20 +
1
2$0
1
2$20 +
1
2$0
color act yy $0 $21
color act bb $21 $0
Note: In treatment B the payo¤s $22 and $21 are reversed.
blue
yellow
H: 1/2
T: 1/2
H: 1/2
T: 1/2
22
0
22
0
blue
yellow
H: 1/2
T: 1/2
H: 1/2
T: 1/2
21
21
0
0
blue
yellow
H: 1/2
T: 1/2
H: 1/2
T: 1/2
20
0
0
20
Figure 1: An illustration of a hedgeact (left), a coloract (center), and a coinact
(right).
to the coin acts.6
Hypothesis In the Anscombe-Aumann framework, no decision maker should choose a
coin act in either of the treatments.
This hypothesis need not hold in a Savage framework (see Eichberger and Kelsey, 1996).
To construct a counter-example, consider a Choquet-Expected Utility (CEU) maximizer
with the following capacity v() and linear utility function u;
6Furthermore, in Treatment A, any ambiguity averse decision maker with symmetric priors should strictly
prefer the hedge acts to the color acts.
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M  N ) v(M)  v(N)
v(?) = 0
v(S) = 1:
It is permissible to assume (see Assumption 3.1 in Eichberger and Kelsey, 1996) that
for all M  R; v(M  U) = p(M);
where p is the additive probability distribution of the randomization device (in our case,
p(H) = p(T ) = 12). Intuitively, the capacity on S respects the probability of the coin ip
for events that exclusively depend on the outcome of the coin ip. Under this assumption,
v(fs1; s2g) = v(fs3; s4g) = 0:5 and, therefore, coin acts are not ambiguous.
Now suppose that v(fsig) = 0:1;8i, and v(fs1; s3g) = v(fs1; s4g) = v(fs2; s3g) =
v(fs2; s4g) = 0:4: In this case,
CEU(h) = 0:5u(20) = 10 > 0:4u(22) = 8: 8  CEU(f);
for all non-coin acts f .7 Thus, a CEU maximizer need not satisfy the above hypothesis.
4 Results
Subjects decisions in our experiment are presented in Table 3. The left hand side presents
how many subjects chose the various acts, while the right hand side combines acts of
the same type and includes the percent of subjects choosing each type of act. The most
important thing to notice is that there are many more coin act decisions than our main
hypothesis would suggest. In fact, coin acts were the most popular choice when combining
the data from both treatments. Statistically, this is a clear rejection of our main hypothesis.
However, this hypothesis is very strict in that a single coin act could be used to justify
rejection. So, it is worth considering whether coin acts could plausibly be explained as
mistakes. If coin acts are a result of mistakes by subjects otherwise consistent with the
Anscombe-Aumann framework, this would mean that (by a conservative estimate) around
1=3 of subjects made mistakes in our experiment. However, it would be more reasonable to
assume that mistakes were randomly distributed over the choices subjects did not intend to
7The inequality is due to the di¤erent payo¤s in treatment A and B.
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make. Since the coin acts represent only 2=5 of possible mistakes subjects could make in our
design, a more realistic estimate of the percentage of mistakes is roughly 5=6 of subjects.
We believe that it is unlikely that 5=6 of our subjects made mistakes when indicating their
preferred act, and so we view our results as a strong rejection of our main hypothesis, even
when allowing for some measurement error.
Table 3: Decision results by treatment
Decision Treatment Total Type Treatment Total
A B A B
bb 11 10 21 Color acts Count 24 15 39
yy 13 5 18 Percent 25:8% 48:4% 31:5%
h 19 5 24 Coin acts Count 34 9 43
t 15 4 19 Percent 36:6% 29:0% 34:7%
by 19 3 22 Hedge acts Count 35 7 42
yb 16 4 20 Percent 37:6% 22:6% 33:9%
Total 93 31 124 Total 93 31 124
4.1 Who chose the coin acts?
While our main hypothesis and results concern the proportion of subjects that chose the
various acts, we can also employ the questionnaire data in order to help explain why certain
acts were chosen. For example, we look at what might have led subjects to choose a coin
act, which is inconsistent with the Anscombe-Aumann framework. For each type of act,
we estimate a linear probability model with a left-hand-side variable equal to 1 if the
subject bet on that type of act and equal to 0otherwise.8 For explanatory variables, we
use ambiguity attitude as measured separately by hypothetical 2- and 3-color Ellsberg urn
questions in the questionnaire. We then use data from a written explanation of the original
incentivized decision, which we asked for in the questionnaire.9 We also use a treatment
dummy and a treatment dummy interacted with a questionnaire response related to payo¤
comparisons. The interaction term is included because the ranking of payo¤s di¤ers across
treatments.
In order to translate subjectswritten explanations into a usable format, we employed
8Logit and probit models yield similar conclusions.
9We asked subjects the following question immediately after choosing their incentivized bets and gave
them a full page to respond: What was your thought process when you made your decision?
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three additional student coders who were asked to read through the questionnaire responses
and identify whether certain topics were discussed. The topics included the relative risk
/ safety and known / unknown likelihood of the di¤erent options, the idea that all
options are equally likely, the relative payo¤s of di¤erent options, and others.10 These
student coders entered a 1 if a topic was discussed, and a 0 otherwise. The three
codings were averaged to create our nal measure of topics discussed, which we use in our
regressions. Regression results are available in Table 4.
Table 4: Regressions of questionnaire responses
Probability of choices
Act Type
Variable Color Coin Hedge
Ambiguity Averse  0:208 0:195 0:013
(3 Color) (0:082) (0:079) (0:073)
Ambiguity Averse  0:210 0:164 0:046
(2 Color) (0:117) (0:112) (0:105)
Risk / Safety  0:137 0:409  0:272
(0:131) (0:125) (0:117)
Known / Unknown  0:113 0:423  0:310
(0:104) (0:100) (0:093)
Equally Likely  0:104  0:421 0:525
(0:130) (0:125) (0:116)
Relative Payo¤s  0:227  0:125 0:353
(0:106) (0:101) (0:094)
Treatment 0:124  0:254 0:131
(Treatment B = 1) (0:111) (0:107) (0:099)
Relative Payo¤  Treatment 0:273 0:152  0:425
(0:227) (0:217) (0:202)
constant 0:647 0:167 0:186
(0:187) (0:179) (0:167)
N 124 124 124
Adjusted R2 0:156 0:263 0:353
*,**,*** - Signicant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
We nd that choosing a coin act seemed to be preferred by subjects that expressed
10A full list of topics and the instructions given to the student coders is available as an appendix. Coders
had access to the experimenters while working in order to ask clarifying questions about the topics, but the
experimenters declined to answer questions about how to code specic responses.
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ambiguity averse preferences in the hypothetical 3-color urn question,11 cited the relative
risk and/or the relatively known likelihoods of various outcomes, and did not comment
on all outcomes being equally likely. Relative payo¤ discussion is negatively correlated to
choosing coin acts (which had the lowest expected payo¤) but not signicantly so.
As one might suspect, choosing a color act was negatively correlated to ambiguity
aversion measures (both 3-color and 2-color measures). Choosing a color act was also
negatively correlated with the discussion of payo¤ di¤erences in treatment A, when Hedge
betting had the highest winning payo¤. In treatment B, when the color acts had the
highest winning payo¤, this e¤ect is cancelled out.
Choosing a hedge act seemed to be preferred by subjects that discussed that acts were
equally likely, and focused on payo¤ di¤erences. This led to much more frequent hedge act
choices in treatment A, where the hedge acts had the highest winning payo¤. Unlike what
would be expected according to theory, choosing hedge acts did not appear particularly
related to ambiguity aversion.
5 Conclusion
Based on our hypothesis, subjects in our experiment should not have chosen coin acts
according to the Anscombe-Aumann framework. However, more than 1/3 of our subjects
did. Given that coin acts made up precisely 1/3 of the options available to subjects,
attributing these choices to measurement error would imply that practically all subjects
erred in their selection or were indi¤erent between options (despite the payo¤ asymmetry).
The latter seems particularly unlikely given the results from the questionnaire that evidence
a sensible pattern of preferences; Ambiguity averse subjects chose the coin acts more often
than ambiguity neutral/loving subjects. So, we are left to assume that subjects expressed
a meaningful preference for the coin acts, contradicting our hypothesis. Many subjects, it
seems, did not view both the coin and hedge acts as 50/50 propositions, or, if they did,
there was some other factor that a¤ected preferences but was not modeled. Either way,
models using the Anscombe-Aumann framework were unable to correctly explain a large
portion of subject decisions in our setting.
While it may seem then that we are left endorsing the Savage framework, we stop short
of such an endorsement. While we do not nd violations within the choice data, since any
11Preferences with respect to the 2-color urn were positively correlated with coin acts, but this relationship
was not signicant.
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choice is plausibly supported in the Savage framework, neither do we nd positive support
for the framework in subjectswritten explanations of their act choices. When asked to
explain the act they chose, fewer than 5% of subjects were coded as having discussed
the combined outcomes that make up the state space in the Savage framework. Instead,
subjects tended to reference the coin ip and the ball draw independently. Of course,
subjects need not express the particulars of a framework in writing in order to employ that
framework in their decision making. Therefore, we see our results as neutral with respect
to the Savage framework, and leave the door open to the possibility that subjects adhere
to a framework we failed to consider in this paper.
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Appendix (for online publication only)
Experimental Instructions
Welcome to our experiment and thank you for participating!
From now on, please dont talk to your neighbors and turn o¤ your mobile phone. If
you have any questions, please raise your hand, and someone will come over and will answer
the question for you.
All participants who observe the rules will denitely receive a guaranteed $10. Fur-
thermore, you have the chance to receive more. Whether you receive an additional amount
depends on your decisions and the outcome of a lottery. At the end of the experiment you
will receive your total payment in cash and anonymously.
On the table of the experimenters we have a bag containing 24 marbles which are either
blue or yellow. The combination of blue and yellow marbles is not known to you. Each
possible combination from 0 blue marbles (and therefore 24 yellow ones) to 24 blue marbles
(and therefore 0 yellow ones) is possible. At the end of the experiment you may take a
look at the bags contents.
Furthermore, there is a dice cup at the table containing a fair coin.
The timing of the experiment is as follows:
1. You choose one winning condition from the options on the Decision Sheet
2. One randomly selected participant blindly draws a marble from the bag.
3. The color of the drawn marble is announced.
4. Another randomly selected participant shakes the cup with the coin inside.
5. The result of the coin ip is announced.
6. You receive your payo¤ as it results from the payo¤ table below.
Your payo¤ will be determined based on the color of the marble drawn, the face of
the coin, and the decisions you make. If the winning condition you have selected matches
the color of the marble and face of the coin, you win the amount specied in the winning
condition in addition to the guaranteed $10. If the winning condition does not match, you
only receive the guaranteed $10. The winning conditions are explained in detail on the
Decision Sheet.
Decision sheet
Please indicate your choice by circling one of the Options below:
Win Conditions (Circle One) Description
12
Option A If you choose Option A, you get $21 if the ball drawn is blue and the
coin shows heads or if the ball drawn is blue and the coin shows tails. You get $0
otherwise.
Option B If you choose Option B, you get $21 if the ball drawn is yellow and the
coin shows headsor if the ball drawn is yellow and the coin shows tails. You get $0
otherwise.
Option C If you choose Option C, you get $20 if the ball drawn is blue and the
coin shows headsor if the ball drawn is yellow and the coin shows heads. You get $0
otherwise.
Option D If you choose Option D, you get $20 if the ball drawn is blue and the
coin shows tails or if the ball drawn is yellow and the coin shows tails. You get $0
otherwise.
Option E If you choose Option E, you get $22 if the ball drawn is blue and the
coin shows headsor if the ball drawn is yellow and the coin shows tails. You get $0
otherwise.
Option F If you choose Option F, you get $22 if the ball drawn is blue and the
coin shows tailsor if the ball drawn is yellow and the coin shows heads. You get $0
otherwise.
After you make your decision, please wait quietly for others to do the same. When
everyone has reached a decision, an experimenter will come around to collect this decision
sheet and hand out a questionnaire. After the questionnaire, the draw and ip will be
made, and payments will be handed out.
Questionnaire
(pg. 1) Please answer the following question:
What was your thought process when you made your decision?
(pg. 2) Please also answer the following questions:
Suppose there is an urn with 30 balls. There are 10 red balls in the urn. The other 20
balls are either white or black with an unknown composition.
One ball is randomly drawn from the urn. Which of the following alternatives would
you prefer?
 You receive $10 if a red ball is drawn.
 You receive $10 if a white ball is drawn.
13
Suppose, instead, you were given the following alternatives. Which would you prefer?
 You receive $10 if a red ball or a black ball is drawn.
 You receive $10 if a white ball or a black ball is drawn.
(pg. 3) Please also answer the following questions:
What gender do you identify as?
 Woman
 Man
 Other (Feel free to elaborate in the space below, if you wish.)
What is your major, or intended major?
 Economics or Business Economics
 Other Business (including MIS, Marketing, etc.)
 Other (Please specify in the space below.)
How old are you?
(pg. 4) Please also answer the following questions:
Suppose there are two urns, each with 10 balls. In one urn (Urn A), there are 5 green
and 5 orange balls. In the other urn (Urn B), the 10 balls are either green or orange with
an unknown composition.
One ball is randomly drawn from an urn of your choice. You will win $10 if the ball is
green. Which of the two urns would you prefer the ball be drawn from?
 Urn A.
 Urn B.
Suppose, instead, you will win $10 if the ball is orange. Which urn would you prefer?
 Urn A.
 Urn B.
(pg. 5) Please also answer the following questions:
Consider the real urn and coin that will be used to determine your payment.
How many blue balls do you think are in the urn?
How many yellow balls do you think are in the urn?
What do you think the chances are that the coin will come up heads?
Thank you for your responses! Please remain quiet while others nish the questionnaire.
When everyone is done, the draw and ip will be performed. Then, an experimenter will
14
come around to pay you.
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